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Abstract A key function of local governments is to provide a wide array of public
services. The supply of these services has been found to create spatial spillovers among
neighbouringmunicipalities. Although it is generally agreed that spillovers are present
in models that explain government expenditures, their type—whether endogenous,
exogenous or residual—and sign—whether positive or negative—remain ambiguous.
In most cases, a subjective process is used to select the type of spatial regressionmodel
used in analysis, with mixed results. Per capita expenditures of ten subprogrammes
(Security, Housing, Welfare, Environment, Social services, Employment promotion,
Health, Education, Culture and Sport) are analysed for all Spanish municipalities with
more than 5000 inhabitants in the 2010–2012 period. A Spatial Seemingly Unre-
lated Regression methodology in a panel framework is used to incorporate correlation
between different subprogrammes and spatial dependence. Our results show that the
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three types of spatial effects are present. Furthermore, substantive dependence is pos-
itive in most cases, while negative residual dependence is observed in some.
Mathematics Subject Classification C21 · C50 · H72
1 Introduction
The last decades have seen a huge increase in research focused on the spatial inter-
actions of public spending policies. The seminal proposals of Case et al. (1993) and
Kelejian and Robinson (1993) have led to several research papers that explored the
relations between local public spending policies and their spatial spillover effects. At
the same time, interest arose in research using models that explain the tax burden of
local governments adding spatial effects (e.g. Brett andPinkse 2000). Both revenue and
expenditure policies show spatial spillovers because of the impact of decisions made
by authorities in neighbouring regions. For example, a low-tax policy in neighbouring
regions can be attractive to both citizens and business, and therefore, the region should
have similar tax levels if they do not want citizens to move to neighbouring regions.
The same philosophy can be transferred to expenditure in public services, particularly
with subprogrammes that are intrinsically linked to citizen welfare. It is evident that
certain welfare policies in a small region cannot be blocked for citizens of neighbour-
ing regions. For instance, a low prices policy in the tickets of a local theatre, museum
or music festival, due to co-financing by local authorities, will certainly benefit the
citizens of neighbouring regions.
These spending policies and their spatial spillovers have generated special inter-
est for investigators. For example, some studies have analysed the total expenditure
of local governments (Case et al. 1993; Solé-Ollé 2006) and others analyse specific
items: Culture (Lundberg 2006; Werck et al. 2008; St’astná 2009; Benito et al. 2013),
Sport and recreational activities (St’astná 2009; Ermini and Santolini 2010), Secu-
rity (Schaltegger and Zemp 2003), Rescue Services (Hanes 2002) or Environment
(St’astná 2009; Ermini and Santolini 2010; Deng et al. 2012; Choumert and Cormier
2011). All these papers propose different models to explain per capita public expend-
ing using spatial econometrics models in order to capture spatial spillovers in the
regression model (Anselin 1988). The set of data was diverse: in some cases, only
the information derived from a single cross section was analysed (Bastida et al. 2013;
Ermini and Santolini 2010; Werck et al. 2008; St’astná 2009; Deng et al. 2012), while
in other cases, panel data techniques are used (Akai and Suhara 2013; Lundberg 2006;
Benito et al. 2013). Moreover, in those papers there is no consensus regarding how to
include spatial effects in the model and the specifications vary. It is easy to find spec-
ifications that introduce endogenous interaction effects, including substantive spatial
dependence, hereinafter spatial lag model (SLM) (Hanes 2002; Ermini and Santolini
2010; Lundberg 2006); or spatial structure in the error term of the regression model,
hereinafter spatial error model (SEM) (Bastida et al. 2013; St’astná 2009). Mixed
specifications including both types of spatial interactions are also common (Case
et al. 1993; Deng et al. 2012). However, the incorporation of exogenous spatial effects
is overlooked and this type of effect is not considered in any studies.
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With regards to the sign of the parameters of spatial dependence, the empirical
evidence is also ambiguous. In most cases, spatial dependence is positive (Bastida
et al. 2013; Revelli 2006; St’astná 2009; Costa et al. 2015), in others it is negative
(Hanes 2002; Lundberg 2006; Akai and Suhara 2013) and there are even models that
incorporate positive and negative structures with two spatial dependence parameters
(Case et al. 1993; St’astná 2009; Deng et al. 2012).
Some of these studies present several methodological shortcomings. One of them
is related to the correct selection of the spatial regression models. Some investigators
use the prevailing custom of adopting the Florax et al. (2003) methodology based on
a comparison of different Lagrange multipliers (LM) tests, but as showed by Mur and
Angulo (2009), this strategy is inefficient, leading to a misspecification of the spatial
effects. Incorrect model selection of the type of spatial dependence induces bias in
parameter estimation and, therefore, an incorrect interpretation of the results. Another
is related to the hypothesis of independence between subprogramme expenditures.
Some papers estimate the expenditure in several subprogrammes without considering
natural relationships (Bastida et al. 2013). Obviously, the hypothesis of independence
between subprogramme expenditure is not true and induces inefficient estimation in
the model’s parameters. Moreover, as highlighted by Case et al. (1993), “there is no
reason to assume that patterns of expenditure interdependence are the same for all
categories of spending” (p. 303).
Our interest is to provide new evidence while obtaining simultaneous estimations
of the expenditure of ten subprogrammes, including spatial effects and correlations
between them. We use the Spatial Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) methodol-
ogy, using model selection based in Mur and Angulo (2009) and extended by López
et al. (2014) in SUR. The study uses per capita local Spanish public spending on ten
subprogrammes: Security, Housing, Welfare, Environment, Social services, Employ-
ment promotion, Health, Education, Culture and Sport.
The paper is structured as follows: the second section contains a brief review of
the literature related to possible spatial dependence mechanisms. The third section
describes the methodology based on SUR models in a panel data framework. The
fourth section presents the most important results and some political implications. In
the last section, we present our conclusions, and some limitations.
2 Spatial effects in public spending
When local government expenditure responsibilities are decentralized, it is difficult
to imagine that local governments make decisions separately. Furthermore, neigh-
bouring municipalities have similar characteristics—demographic, economic and
political—asmost administrative boundaries are artificial. Therefore,we should expect
(dis)similarities in the spending items of spatially close local governments.
2.1 Sources of spatial dependence
Three different sources can generate spatial dependence in local expenditure policies:
On the one hand, some spending policies are determined by the specific characteris-
tics of the region (e.g. population structure, taxes and area),whichwill act as exogenous
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variables in themodelling of public spending and determine specific spending policies.
It seems plausible to assume thatmunicipalities that are close to each other have similar
socio-demographical and economic characteristics. In this case, spatial dependence
would be caused by similar characteristics and citizens’ preferences.
Independent variable X of region A → Dependent variable Y of region B.
For example, a high percentage of the population over 65 can determine more
spending on culture, but nearbymunicipalities are also certain to have high percentages
of population over 65 years and therefore also demand spending in this subprogramme.
Therefore, in themodel specification, it will probably necessary to incorporate not only
the X variables but also some information about neighbouring regions’ X variables.
This type of spatial dependence may be introduced in the modelling including spatial
lag of exogenous factors (WX in spatial econometric terminology). These spatial
effects have been overlooked in most of the studies that analyse this topic.
Dependent variable Y of region A ←→ Dependent variable Y of region B.
In this case, from a theoretical point of view, it is possible to differentiate between
cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour (St’astná 2009). In the first case, coopera-
tive behaviour emerges from working on joint projects, from sharing experiences and
from the learning process. Cooperative mechanisms also arise when local neighbour-
ing governments implement specialization strategies to provide certain services to the
citizens (Baicker 2005). In the second case, (dis)similarities can also arise in spending
policies as a result of non-cooperative behaviour. Usually, these spillovers emerge as
a result of mimetic behaviour by local governments, largely due to the phenomenon
known as Yardstick competition (Revelli 2006). Negative spatial spillovers can also
arise when there are non-cooperative replacement mechanism strategies. If a local
government makes a heavy investment in one item of expenditure, the neighbouring
local governments reduce their investment in this item, as their citizens can benefit
from the former’s services. In order to incorporate those spatial spillovers, the spatial
lag of endogenous variables (WY) can be included in the specification.
Finally, local governments located in the same geographic area could be affected
by the same external shocks or the same economic policies of higher-level govern-
ments, which could also determine the existence of spatial dependence. Moreover,
the omission of spatially correlated variables in the specification also contributes to
spatial autocorrelation patterns. In those cases, the model can include a spatially auto-
correlated error term.
Error term ε of region A ←→ Error term ε of region B.
This type of spatial effect has been reported in the case of fiscal policy changes
(Allers and Elhorst 2005).
2.2 Sign of spatial dependence
The sign of the parameter that captures level of spatial dependence can be interpreted
in different ways.
Negative spatial dependence
Substitutive mechanisms induce negative spatial dependence. For example, the provi-
sion of cultural goods or environmental protection in a region can increase the welfare
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of the residents from neighbouring regions. A possible reaction of the local govern-
ments would be to profit from these services and decrease their expenditure in these
budget items, reallocating resources to other welfare policies. In those cases, wewould
expect to find models with negative spatial autocorrelation because if a nearby local
governments makes a heavy investment in a certain item of expenditure, the neigh-
bouring government will dedicate its resources to other spending policies.
Lundberg (2006) presents empirical evidence of those interaction mechanisms
showing the substitutive character of public spending in culture and recreational activ-
ities for Swedish local governments. Using SURmethodology (in this paper, it enables
correlations for different time periods), he identifies parameters of substantive, neg-
ative and significant spatial dependence. In his conclusions, Lundberg maintains that
these spending items are used in substitutive form by local governments. Along the
same lines, and also with a panel approach, Akai and Suhara (2013) analyse the
expenditure on culture for the 1997–2007 period of 45 local governments in Japan.
Like Lundberg (2006), the authors identify strong negative spatial dependence using
a variety of connectivity matrices.
Another cause that can generate negative spatial dependence structures would be
cooperative situations between local governments that agree to design their spending
policies establishing specializations. One example is showed by Schaltegger andZemp
(2003),who analyse different spending subprogrammes using panelmethodologywith
spatial dependence in 100 Swiss communes for the 1992–2001 period. The authors
identify a strong structure of negative spatial dependence in security expenditures
showing cooperative behaviour.
Positive spatial dependence
Local governments can also emulate their neighbours in decisions regarding their
spending policies. There are two cases in which this kind of behaviour is found. The
first can be explained by Yardstick competition theory (Revelli 2006), according to
which local governments tend to emulate the behaviour of their neighbours trying not
to get too far out of line with the policies enacted in nearby jurisdictions as voters make
comparisons between the services provided in their setting. St’astná (2009) finds posi-
tive spatial dependence in subprogrammes relating to expenditure in housing, regional
development, sport and recreational activities. Revelli (2006) explores spatial effects in
the provision of social services and finds that the source of positive spatial dependence
in social expenditure is a mimetic effect between neighbouring municipalities. Ermini
and Santolini (2010) also test the interdependence between 246 Italian municipalities
and find evidence of positive and significant interactions both in total expenditure
and for different subprogrammes (security, environment, roads). Solé-Ollé (2006) and
Bastida et al. (2013), in Spain, also present a model to assess the spillovers resulting
from local government policies.
Positive spatial structures can also be found due to cooperation and coordination
mechanisms between neighbouring local governments. For example, neighbouring
municipalities can work on a set of projects, finance an infrastructure or make invest-
ments to protect the environment. There is little evidence of this behaviour in the
literature, and we note here the contribution by Reifschneider (2006).
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Positive and negative spatial dependence
The last situation refers to simultaneous structures of positive and negative spatial
dependence. The interpretation in this case is more complex because different mech-
anisms of interaction are included in the same model. The first paper referring to two
simultaneous types of spatial dependence is Case et al. (1993), proposing SARAR
model (Mixed regressive–spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive dis-
turbance), identifying substantive (+) and residual (−) spatial dependence. St’astná
(2009) also estimates SARAR finding substantive (−) and residual (+) spatial depen-
dence in expenditure in industry, infrastructures and environment protection, whereas
in housing and regional development he finds substantive (+) and residual (−) spatial
dependence. Gebremariam et al. (2012) estimate a spatial lag with spatial error model
andfind substantive (+ and non-significant) and residual (−) spatial dependence.Deng
et al. (2012) in environment protection find substantive (−) and residual (+) spatial
dependence in a SARMA model.
3 Methodology
3.1 Spanish institutional framework
In Spain, there are three vertical government levels: central, regional and municipal.
There are seventeen regional governments, the so-called Autonomous Communities
or regions (ACs, Nuts II in Eurostat terminology), which have fairly wide-ranging
spending responsibilities, mainly the provision of healthcare and education. On the
other hand, there are more than eight thousand municipalities (85.2% of them are
small, with less than five thousand inhabitants). Municipalities have the obligation
by law to provide services according to number of inhabitants (>5000, e.g. public
parks, market squares, public library; >20,000, e.g. social services, sport facilities;
>50,000, e.g. urban transport). Figure 1 shows the administrative division of Spain
without the islands. Municipalities can also provide another set of non-compulsory
services (non-compulsory expenditure does not mean it is not essential for citizens).
Approximately 25% of municipal spending is non-compulsory, to ensure equal access
to services for all inhabitants. On the other hand, the main sources of municipal rev-
enue are local taxes (two-thirds) and transfers from regional and central government
(one-third). With regards to political organization, each municipality has a local gov-
ernment that is democratically elected every four years. This government has total
autonomy to decide the municipal budget each year. The budget must be approved by
the governing council. Thus, the governing political party has a substantial impact on
budget distribution in subprogrammes.
3.2 Data and variables
Our dataset includes information about per capita spending in euros, of 1201 Spanish
municipalities with a population of more than 5000 inhabitants in 10 subprogrammes
for three years, 2010–2012. These municipalities concentrate more than 80% of the
Spanish population. The list of subprogrammes is: Security, Housing, Welfare, Envi-
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Fig. 1 Administrative division. Autonomous Communities and municipalities
ronment, Social services, Employment promotion, Health, Education, Culture and
Sport. Table 1 shows details of budget related to several needs of the population for
each subprogramme. The lowest level of spending per capita (mean) is in the Health
subprogramme, 8.92e per capita in 2011. This low value is because healthcare is a
regional responsibility in Spain, and municipalities only provide some supplementary
services. The highest levels of per capita spending (mean) are in welfare with 136.2e
in 2011 and housing with 124.43e per capita, associated with local infrastructures
(roads, town planning, etc.). These ten subprogrammes cover almost the entire range
of local government spending responsibilities, and they represent more than 68% of
total municipal expenditure. The data were obtained from the Spanish Ministry of
Finance and Public Administrations.
In addition to these ten dependent variables, there is a series of explanatory factors
that have been considered significant in similar studies (e.g. Ermini and Santolini 2010;
Benito et al. 2013; St’astná 2009). The set of explanatory expenditure variables along
with the source of information and the expected sign are shown in Table 1. Factors
have been grouped in four categories: Political factors (Participation; Left-Wing and
Alignment), Population structure (Total, Young, Middle-aged and Old), Economic
(GDP, Unemployment and Debt) and Geographic factors (Surface and Density). The
last columns of Table 1 show descriptive statistics for each analysed year.
The political, demographic and geographic variables are assumed as exogenous
factors to explain municipal expenditure. This belief was based on the fact that munic-
ipalities have little or no control over demographic variables (such as surface area,
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population density andpercentage of youngpeople).However, economic factors (GDP,
Unemployment and Debt) could be endogenous due to simultaneity. In order to reduce
the impact of endogeneity, we consider two time lags as instruments of this variable.
Finally, the models include sixteen dummy variables, one for each region in each cross
section, in order to control the unobservable spatial fixed effects in the model.
3.3 Econometric model
The simplestmodel, proposed in this study, is a pure SURmodel without spatial effects
(SUR-SIM):
Ygt = ACgtδg + Xgtβg + εgt (1)
where Ygt is related to a vector R×1 of spending policy g (g = 1, . . . , G) for period t
(t = 1, . . ., T ) of R local governments. In order to control the impact of the high level
of governance due to Autonomous Communities, we include a space-time fixed effect
for each region ACgt that is a R×16 where δg = (δg1, . . . , δg16) with ACgt (i, j) = 1
if municipality “i ” belongs to Autonomous Community “ j”. The modelling implies
constant βg coefficients in t and enables the inclusion of correlations between residuals
of explanatory models of the different spending units, such that E[εgtε′ht] = σgh IR.
As mentioned in Sect. 2, the theoretical literature assumes the presence of spatial
interaction between different local governments. Several models have been proposed
(e.g. Brueckner 2003) to incorporate these interactions. The taxonomy of spatial mod-
els that we present in this paper is well known (see Elhorst 2014) and we extend in
the SUR framework.
The spatial lag of X SURmodel (SUR-SLX) is an extension of SUR-SIM including
spatial lag of exogenous variables:
Ygt = ACgtδg + Xgtβg + W Xgtθg + εgt (2)
where W is a matrix R×R used to introduce the neighbouring structure (Anselin
1988).
The spatial lag SURmodel (SUR-SLM) incorporates a spatial lag of the dependent
variable as an explanatory factor.
Ygt = λgWY gt + ACgtδg + Xgtβg + εgt (3)
This specification assumes that spending in a subprogramme (Ygt) is partially deter-
mined by the weighted average (WY gt) of spending in neighbouring municipalities.
Parameter λg identifies the intensity and the sign of the impact (+/−) of the policies
of neighbouring municipalities.
The classical alternative specification to SUR-SLM is the spatial error SUR model
(SUR-SEM) that introduces spatial structure in the residuals of the model and has the
following specification:
Ygt = ACgtδg + Xgtβg + ugt; ugt = ρgtWugt + εgt (4)
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These three alternatives can be combined, obtaining several alternatives, the Spatial
Durbin SUR model (SUR-SDM) and the Spatial Durbin Error SUR model (SUR-
SDE). Finally, the most general specification is the General Nesting Spatial SUR
model (SUR-GNS) that incorporates all types of spatial effects:
Ygt = λgWY gt + ACgtδg + Xgtβg + WXgtθg + ugt; ugt = ρgtWugt + εgt (5)
All models are estimated by maximum likelihood. The strategies of selection and
comparison between these models are present in López et al. (2014). Finally, unlike
in Allers and Elhorst (2011), no total budget constraints are included in this model.
4 Results
4.1 Why a SUR with spatial effects?
There is high correlation between the ten spending subprogrammes. The upper diago-
nal of Table 2 shows the correlations between subprogrammes in 2011. For example,
correlation between education and culture is 0.27 (0.29 in 2010 and 0.32 in 2012)
and correlation between education and sport is 0.17 (0.18 in 2010 and 0.22 in 2012).
However, there are other subprogrammes that have negative correlations. For example,
the correlation between employment and welfare is−0.08 (−0.15 for 2011 and−0.09
for 2012). These results suggest that there will be similar symptoms in the model’s
residuals, so SURmethodology should be used (correlations between residuals of final
model in lower diagonal of Table 2).
With regards to spatial structure, before testing spatial dependence we have to select
a matrix W = (wi j ) that identifies neigbouring municipalities (Anselin 1988). There
is no general agreement on how to select this weight matrix although, in our case, the
connectivity criterion should assure that the distance between municipalities enables
reasonable times for inhabitant flows. In this study, we consider municipalities to be
connected if the distance between centroids is less than d km (d = 25, 30). This
criterion assigns a large number of neighbours for some municipalities, so we limit
the number of neighbours to a maximum of k (k = 8, 9), selecting the nearest. We
consider two different weights α(α = 0, 2) . Formally,
w(α, d, k)i j =
{
d−αi j if i ∈ Nk( j) and di j < d km
0 in other case
where Nk( j) is the set of k nearest neighbourhoods of municipality i and di j is the
Euclidean distance. Matrices W have been standardized by rows as usual. The results
of the LM tests of spatial dependence in SUR-SIM model for several W(α, d, k) are
showed in the first rows of Table 3. All LM tests reject the null and confirm a strong
structure of spatial correlation in the residual. Given the high values of the LM-SUR-
SARAR tests, it is evident that the baseline model is misspecified in relation to the
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spatial dimension. We decided to select W = W (0,30,8) as the LM-SUR-SARAR
takes the higher value though using other parameters in W get similar results.1
Finally, alternative methodologies could be used to include spatial effects. Firstly,
the spatial simultaneous equation model (e.g. Baltagi and Deng 2015) is a natural can-
didate but, in our opinion, the dependent variables are not co-dependent. For example,
expenditure in the Health subprogramme is not an explanatory variable of expenditure
in employment. The dependent variables are simply correlated in their regression error
terms. Another alternative could be a dynamic spatial panel methodology with fixed
or random effects (e.g. Elhorst 2014, Cap. 4), but those models are more appropriate
in case of a single subprogramme and obtain independent estimations. Therefore, a
spatial SUR approach is more reasonable for our purpose.
4.2 Estimation and selection of SUR model with spatial effects
Several tests are performed to find the most appropriate spatial model. Firstly, the
SUR-SLX is estimated to extend the SUR-SIM model including exogenous interac-
tion effects (WX). Table 3 shows the results. The likelihood ratio test is applied2 to
test the hypotheses of whether spatially lagged independent variables are jointly sig-
nificant (H0 : θ = 0 in model 2) and the null is rejected (LR=445.2), so SUR-SLX
is preferred. In SUR-SLX, all LM tests again showed clear symptoms of spatial auto-
correlations in the residuals rejecting the null hypothesis of independence. Now, we
consider three alternatives combining different spatial effects: SUR-SDM; SUR-SDE
and SUR-GNS. The results for SUR-SDM and SUR-SDE including spatial exogenous
effects are showed in the last rows of Table 3. Both models are preferred to SUR-SLX
in likelihood ratio terms (LRSLMvsSDM = 330.6; LRSLMvsSDM = 156.2), but in both
cases, the marginal LM tests3 reject the null of independence in the residuals of these
models, showing that the correct specification is the model that incorporates all spatial
effects, SUR-GNS.
Table 4 shows the results of the final model. SUR-GNS is clearly superior to SUR-
SDM and SUR-SDE in likelihood terms. In this model, the signs of the substantive
spatial dependence parameter (λg) are positive and significant for eight equations,
while residual spatial dependence parameters (ρg) are significant and negative for
five subprogrammes. A comparison between the SUR-SLX and SUR-GNS reveals
the degree to which the coefficients are over or underestimated. For example, the
coefficient of Debt in the Security subprogramme in the SUR-SLX is −1.00, yet
−13.48 in SUR-GNS. Therefore, the impact of Debt is strongly overestimated if
spatial effects are not considered. Similar results are obtained for other variables.
1 Similar results with α = 0 and d = 30km and k = 9 nearest neighbourhoods or α = 0 d = 25km and
k = 8 nearest neighbourhoods. Not reported to save space but available under request.
2 For spatial econometric models the use of the standard R2 is not appropriate—the R2 is uninformative
and should be interpreted with caution (Anselin 1988). Therefore, the maximized log-likelihood value is
used for models estimated by maximum likelihood as goodness of fit criteria.
3 The marginal test LM-SUR(ρ|λ ) testing for the presence of spatial error structure in a model with spatial
lag (SUR-SDM) and LM-SUR(λ|ρ ) testing for the presence of spatial lag in a model with spatial error
structure (SUR-SDE).
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4.3 Interpretation βgk coefficients in SUR-GNS: direct, indirect and total effects
For classical regression model estimation, parameter interpretation is easy since para-
meters can be interpreted as the partial derivatives of the dependent variable relative
to the explanatory variable LeSage and Pace (2009). For spatial regression mod-
els, parameter interpretation becomes richer and more complicated. A change in the
explanatory variable for a single observation can potentially affect the dependent vari-
able of all other observations. In essence, the idea is that spatial dependence expands
the information set to include information from neighbouring regions.
The results of LeSage and Pace (2009) can be extended to the SUR framework.
Note that
∂Yg
∂Xk
= (IR − λgW)−1(IRβgk + Wθgk) (6)
According to Elhorst (2014), these partial derivatives have the following interpreta-
tion: if an explanatory variable (Xk) in a particular municipality changes, not only
will government expenditure per capita in that region change, but also government
expenditure in other municipalities. Therefore, a change in Xk in a particular munic-
ipality has a direct effect on that region, but also an indirect effect on neighbouring
municipalities. Note that the ith diagonal element of the matrix of partial derivatives
represents the direct effect on the ith region and non-diagonal elements of ith row of
the matrix of partial derivatives represent the indirect effects on other municipalities.
In order to obtain a global indicator, the direct effect is calculated as the mean of the
diagonal elements and captures the average change in government expenditure caused
by the change in Xk. Likewise, a global indicator of the indirect effects is calculated
as the mean of the non-diagonal elements. The total effect is the sum of direct and
indirect effects. Finally, note that if λg = 0 and θgk = 0, the indirect effects are 0 and
the direct effects are equal to βgk.
Table 5 shows the direct, indirect and total effects for the SUR-GNS. The first
result to be highlighted is that the exogenous variables have a different total impact
for each subprogramme. This result again confirms Case et al. (1993 p. 303). For
example, no variable has a significant total effect for the Health subprogramme. This
is to be expected because the healthcare system in Spain is the responsibility of the
regional government (ACs), and the municipal government only has partial responsi-
bility. However, most exogenous factors have a significant total impact on Security,
Welfare, Social services or Culture subprogrammes. These subprogrammes aremainly
the responsibility of local government and have a close relationship with council man-
agement.
Table 5 provides a great deal of information about the impact of exogenous vari-
ables on subprogramme expenditure and requires some comments. Firstly, for political
reasons, left-wing parties have a significant total impact on Housing, Social services,
Employment, Education and Sport; all the effects are positive, so a higher percentage
of left-wing voters increases the total effect on expenditure in these subprogrammes.
The left-wing electorate has lower income levels and accordingly supports social poli-
cies on wealth redistribution. (Hibbs 1977) and St’astná (2009) show similar results
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for culture. The empirical results show that these final effects are the results of differ-
ent processes. For Housing, Culture and Sport, the final effect is only due to indirect
effects while, in Social services and Education, the total effect is direct. The partic-
ipation variable has a significant total effect on Security, Welfare, Social services,
Employment and Education. A high percentage of people participating in elections is
an indicator of sensitized citizens. High levels of participation increase expenditure
in Social services and Education, due to direct and indirect effects. However, the total
effect of this variable is negative and significant in Security, Welfare and Education
subprogrammes. Finally, alignment variable has a total positive impact on Security,
Housing, Welfare, Environment and Culture. It could be due to the competencies
transferred from regional governments.
Secondly, demographic factors influence expenditure in several programmes. The
total population increases expenditure in Culture due to an indirect effect and reduces
spending in Security, Housing and Welfare due to direct effects. The negative sign
of those coefficients can be explained as the result of a scale economy process. The
young population has a positive total effect in Social Services, while the coefficients
are negative in Housing, Welfare, Environment and Education. The percentage of
elderly population has a total positive effect on Social services for obvious reasons.
Thirdly, we consider economic determinants. According to GDP, the total effect is
significant and negative in Culture. Some authors (Getzner 2004; Lewis and Rushton
2007) present other results and have suggested that higher income levels lead to a
greater demand for cultural services. But there is evidence of a negative impact Schulze
and Rose (1998) that is not significant (Werck et al. 2008). The debt variable has total
positive effects on Security and Education due to indirect effects.
Finally, regarding geographic factors, the effects of the surface area variable are not
reported because it has neither a direct nor an indirect impact. Population density is
significant and positive inHousing, Social services, Employment, Education and Sport
subprogrammes. This result shows that high population density suggests closeness to
services and therefore high consumption. Moreover, population density may lead to
economies of scale in the provision of local government services, but the empirical
evaluation of the impact of this variable shows mixed results. By example, a similar
result was found by St’astná (2009) and opposite by Bastida et al. (2013).
4.4 Spatial spillovers in public expenditure on a municipal level
At this point, it is of interest to provide an interpretation of the spatial dependence
coefficients. Firstly, exogenous spatial lags are significant inmost subprogrammes. For
example, five exogenous spatial lags are significant in Housing, Welfare and Culture.
None, however, are significant inEnvironment. These results confirm the importance of
this type of spatial dependence that has been overlooked in studies of spatial spillovers
in municipal spending. Secondly, it is evident that an increase in a municipality’s
expenditure has an impact on the spending of neighbouring municipalities because
endogenous spatial interaction effects are present in local government expenditure. For
most subprogrammes, the λg coefficients are significant and positive (not significant in
Environment but ρg is positive and significant). Substantive spatial dependence levels
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are similar for the eight subprogrammes with significant coefficients, ranging from
0.13 to 0.22. Case et al. (1993), Baicker (2005) and Bastida et al. (2013) obtained
similar spatial dependence values. This type of positive spatial dependence reflects
how a municipality influences variations in neighbouring municipality budgets, and
has been associated to a comparison, yardstick or coordinationmechanism (Brueckner
2003).
Thirdly, there is a negative spatial dependence structure in the residual in five
subprogrammes. The values ofρg are negative and significant for three subprogrammes
included in “Production of Public Goods” (Education, Culture and Sport), and in the
Security and Welfare subprogrammes. Case et al. (1993) obtained exactly the same
result (positive and negative spatial dependence in the same model), and the authors
attribute it to a positive effect of substantive spatial dependence that is accompanied
by a nonlinear structure in the residuals (negative). The study by Revelli (2001, p.
1101) attributes the simultaneous presence of the two forms of spatial dependence to
the effect of a multi-level government structure. This could be the situation in Spain
where the three different administrations share spending policies. But this multi-level
effect should appear in the model with positive signs both in substantive and residual
spatial dependence due to expenditure policies in a region (ACs) andwould be the same
in every municipality. Moreover, the SUR-GNM model included sixteen dummies to
control fixed spatial effects (not reported to save space), so that is probably not the
cause in Spain.
In general, the spatial econometric literaturemostly showsmodelswith positive spa-
tial dependence, but there is evidence that in thosemodels there is always some level of
hidden negative spatial autocorrelation (Griffith 2006). Following the idea of Griffith
(2006) andGriffith andArbia (2010), spatial autocorrelation is always amixture of pos-
itive and negative spatial autocorrelation, but negative spatial autocorrelation is only
detected at a fine geographical resolution since aggregating areal units into a coarser
resolution will average dissimilitude. But this is not the case for our results because
in the sample all municipalities are medium sized or large (>5000 inhabitants). On
the other hand, the spatial econometric literature relates spatial correlated error terms
to the subspecification of the model, where some exogenous variables are missing
and are themselves spatially dependent (Brueckner 2003, p. 184). In this respect, a
possible cause of alternation in the signs of spatial dependence could be attributed
to the fact that local governments make decisions about municipal spending based
on two criteria. They first imitate what occurs in neighbouring municipalities (posi-
tive and substantive spatial dependence) because nearby municipalities have the same
political sign. On the other hand, local governments adopt political decisions hardly
explained using exogenous factors in an econometric model and strategically planning
municipal spending through substitutive mechanisms following the idea proposed by
Lundberg (2006). These substitutive mechanisms induce a shock in the model, usu-
ally related to residual spatial dependence (negative spatial error dependence). Note
that the negative sign of the spatial dependence in the error term is present largely in
the four “Production of Public Goods” subprogrammes and Welfare, which are more
likely to show flows of citizens who benefit from the services provided by neighbour-
ing municipalities. Those results confirm, and extend to several subprogrammes, the
hypothesis presented by Lundberg (2006).
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4.5 Policy implication
Municipal managers are that most of the services that they provide are also enjoyed by
inhabitants from surrounding municipalities, and vice versa. The empirical evidence
shown in this study reveals the important impact of spatial factors on determination of
spending inmost of the analysed subprogrammes. Note that in our modelling, we went
from a correlation between observed values and predictions in the baseline model of
r(y, yhat) = 0.59 to r(y, yhat) = 0.79 adding only spatial factors. This result shows
effective interaction between local communities.
Several countries have pursued inter-municipal co-operation as an instrument for
local government reform. Spain is not alien to this question and debate about the ratio-
nalization of local administration grows in periods of economic crisis, when resources
are limited. Our empirical findings confirm that, in practice, municipal managers take
into account the demographic, economic and social structure of the surroundingmunic-
ipalities and do not develop isolated policies. Spain is a mosaic of more than 8000
municipalities, most of them very small, and debate about the fusion of local munici-
palities is alive in Spanish economic circles. The results showed in this paper confirm
that the fusion of municipalities in Spain would have a small impact in terms of
municipal spending. Although our findings are based on municipalities larger than
5000 inhabitants, we are confident that similar results would be found for smaller
municipalities.
The development of this kind of model can also be a useful tool for identifying the
main determining factors of municipal spending and to elaborate equitable laws on
the reform of state funding for local communities. The empirical approach adopted in
this paper can be replicated in institutional settings other than Spain one to increase
understanding of the consequences of local council partnerships on fiscal policies at
lower levels of government.
5 Conclusions
Researchers have shown evidence that confirms the hypothesis that local authorities do
not make budgetary distribution decisions in isolation. On the contrary, they consider
the behaviour of nearby local governments. This hypothesis has already been tested in
empirical studies for several countries (e.g. Werck et al. 2008 in Belgium; Lundberg
2006 in Sweden; St’astná 2009 in Czech Republic; Ermini and Santolini 2010 in Italy;
Allers and Elhorst 2011 in Netherlands; Costa et al. 2015 in Portugal), but to date,
there is little literature related to Spain (Bastida et al. 2013; Solé-Ollé 2006).
Our results shown a correlation structure between the residuals of the model,
which supports the SUR estimation while confirming the presence of a strong spatial
structure. The results show the presence of three different sources of spatial effects:
endogenous, exogenous and residual. Firstly, the exogenous spatial factors show that
local governments are influenced by the characteristics of their neighbours (population
structure, economic level, etc.). Secondly, the level of expenditure of said neighbours
has a significant and positive impact on most subprogrammes, showing the presence
of the some of the spatial effects described in Sect. 2 (cooperation, yardstick effects,
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etc.), although in this model is unable to identify the mechanism that generates such
dependence. Lastly, and for five subprogrammes, an error spatial structure is identified
in the model. From our perspective, the cause that could generate a negative sign in
the parameter of spatial dependence in the residuals is related to municipal political
decisions, which cannot be included in econometric modelling. Note that this kind
of spatial dependence is attributed to the omission of relevant factors that have not
been taken into consideration. This evidence would confirm the hypothesis of Lund-
berg (2006), showing the presence of substitutive mechanisms (which would generate
a negative sign) in municipal spending decisions. New research could advance in
identifying the causes of these observed effects on local government public spending
policies.
Finally, we have to admit that the approach used in the paper may have at least
three fundamental weaknesses that merit some further comments. Firstly, it can be
argued that the SUR model is static. Although consider a SUR model in a spatio-
temporal framework, the temporal dynamics are limited. We do not consider dynamic
behaviour due to the short period of analysis, but new results must be obtained when
more information is available. Secondly, we do not consider co-dependence between
subprogrammes based on the theoretical absence of a causal relationship in the expen-
diture of different subprogrammes but, as Allers and Elhorst (2011) point out, due
to the effective budget restriction in all municipalities, there is economic–theoretical
argument to regress one dependent variable on the others4 because spending in a sub-
programme is linked to spending in the rest of subprogrammes. But in this paper, the
expenditure of 10 subprogrammes is around 68% of the total budget, so the level of
co-dependence is probably not very high. Lastly, we consider three types of spatial
dependence for each subprogramme (in total 12 ∗ 10 + 10 + 10 = 140 parameters
related to spatial effects are estimated), and therefore, the model could be affected by
parameter identification problems (Burridge et al. 2016). Burridge et al. (2016) noted
that the model with a full set of interaction effect is almost never used in empirical
applications due to two popular misconceptions. The first reason is that to date, no
one has proved generals conditions under which the parameters of GNS are identified
(except Lee et al. 2010). The second one is that the GNS model can be overparameter-
ized, as result of which the significance levels of all effects tend to fall (Elhorst 2014
p. 33), as a results of which this model does not outperform the more simple SDM or
SDE models. But this is not the case for the empirical evidence shown in this paper,
where all spatial effects are significant in the SUR-GNS model. In any case, there is
scarce literature on this topic and more research is required.
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